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Katrin Wagner
Head of Investment Content Switzerland
Chief Investment Strategist
Berkshire’s Q1 2026 13F showed a more active and focused portfolio, with a major increase in Alphabet, new exposure to Delta Air Lines, and exits from several large names including Amazon, UnitedHealth, Visa and Mastercard.
The early Abel playbook does not look like a rejection of Buffett’s principles. It looks more like an update: value investing applied to a market where technology platforms now carry the cash flow, scale and moat characteristics that old-economy franchises once dominated.
For investors, the message is not to copy the filing. It is to understand the signal: Big Tech is becoming core market infrastructure, but the next phase of the AI trade will likely reward selectivity, cash-flow discipline and valuation awareness.
Berkshire Hathaway’s latest 13F was especially closely watched because it was the first major quarterly filing under Greg Abel’s leadership. Berkshire remains Berkshire: concentrated, patient and cash-flow focused. But the latest reshuffle also suggests that the portfolio may be adapting to a market where technology is no longer just a growth sector — it is part of the economy’s operating system.
| Holding | Ticker | Approx. value added / position value | % change | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alphabet | GOOGL / GOOG | Position increased to around $16.6bn | More than tripled | The most important signal. Berkshire appears more willing to own dominant digital platforms when the moat, cash flow and valuation case align. |
| Delta Air Lines | DAL | New position of around $2.65bn | New holding | Suggests selective interest in travel and consumer resilience, although airlines remain exposed to fuel prices and economic slowdowns. |
| Lennar | LEN / LEN.B | Added roughly $270mn, taking the position to around $897mn | Class A +43%; Class B +31% | Adds a housing-cycle angle to the portfolio. It suggests Berkshire is still willing to own cyclical, rate-sensitive businesses when valuations look attractive. |
| Macy’s | M | New position of around $55mn | New holding | Small in Berkshire terms, but notable as a selective consumer/retail bet. The size suggests it is more of a watch item than a major portfolio signal. |
| New York Times | NYT | Stake more than doubled | More than doubled | A smaller but interesting signal around subscription-based media and durable consumer relationships. |
| Overall portfolio | — | U.S.-listed equity portfolio value fell to around $263bn, from around $274bn at end-2025 | — | Berkshire was still a net seller of equities, so this was not a broad risk-on shift. It was a reshuffle, not a buying spree. |
Berkshire’s full exits were broad, but the largest ones deserve the most attention. The exit from Visa and Mastercard stands out because both have historically been viewed as high-quality compounders. The exit from UnitedHealth adds to the sense of portfolio clean-up, while Amazon is smaller in dollar terms but symbolically important given the shift toward Alphabet.
| Holding | Ticker | Approx. value exited | % change | Why it matters |
| Visa | V | $2.71bn | -100% | Biggest full exit; notable because of Visa’s quality and payments moat. |
| Mastercard | MA | $2.14bn | -100% | Major payments exit alongside Visa. |
| UnitedHealth Group | UNH | $1.50bn | -100% | Large healthcare exit amid stock-specific and regulatory overhangs. |
| Domino’s Pizza | DPZ | $1.32bn | -100% | One of the biggest consumer exits. |
| Aon | AON | $1.22bn | -100% | Large exit from insurance and professional services exposure. |
| Pool Corp | POOL | $668mn | -100% | Meaningful full exit from a cyclical consumer/housing-linked business. |
| Amazon | AMZN | $505mn | -100% | Smaller by Berkshire standards, but symbolically important given the Big Tech angle. |
| HEICO | HEIA | $301mn | -100% | Exit from aerospace-linked exposure. |
| Liberty Formula One | FWONK | $275mn | -100% | Full exit from a tracking-stock/media exposure. |
| Charter Communications | CHTR | $234mn | -100% | Full exit from cable and connectivity exposure. |
| Lamar Advertising | LAMR | $152mn | -100% | Full exit from advertising and outdoor media exposure. |
| Allegion | ALLE | $119mn | -100% | Full exit from security products exposure. |
| Liberty Latin America C | LILA | $19mn | -100% | Smaller full exit. |
| Diageo | DEO | $18mn | -100% | Small position fully exited. |
| Liberty Latin America A | LILAK | $11mn | -100% | Smaller full exit. |
| Atlanta Braves Holdings | BATRK | $5mn | -100% | Small but complete exit. |
These trims are also important, but they should be read differently from the full exits. Chevron was the biggest reduction by value, but it remained a major Berkshire holding. Constellation Brands was nearly eliminated, but not fully exited.
| Holding | Ticker | Approx. value reduced | % change | Why it matters |
| Chevron | CVX | $8.23bn | -35.17% | Biggest reduction by value, but still a top holding. Not necessarily a bearish oil call. |
| Constellation Brands | STZ | $1.79bn | -95.13% | Near-exit, but not a full exit. |
| Nucor | NUE | $415mn | -39.03% | Sharp reduction in steel and industrial exposure. |
| DaVita | DVA | $160mn | -4.05% | Modest trim. |
| Bank of America | BAC | $156mn | -0.71% | Small trim only; not a major signal by itself. |
| Liberty Live Holdings | LLYVK | $29mn | -3.03% | Small trim only. |
The headline is not that Berkshire has suddenly become a technology fund. Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola, Bank of America and Chevron still matter deeply to the portfolio. But the Alphabet move is hard to ignore. It suggests Berkshire may now be more comfortable treating some mega-cap technology companies as modern value stocks: dominant, cash-rich, highly profitable and strategically embedded in the global economy.
The risk with every Berkshire 13F is overinterpretation. The filing does not tell us which individual manager made each decision, why a position was changed, or whether the position still exists today. But the scale and direction of the Q1 changes still offer a useful lens.
This does not look like a clean break from Buffett. It looks more like an evolution of the Berkshire toolkit.
For decades, classic value investing was associated with banks, consumer staples, insurance, railroads, energy and industrial businesses. But the market has changed. Some of the strongest balance sheets and most durable cash flows now sit inside mega-cap technology.
Alphabet, Microsoft, Apple and other platform companies are not just “growth stocks” anymore. They have recurring revenues, global scale, high margins, enormous cash generation and the ability to fund major investment cycles internally. That gives them some defensive qualities even when valuations look demanding.
The Abel-era message may be this: value is not defined by sector. It is defined by durability of cash flows, competitive advantage and price paid.
The latest 13Fs across major investors point to a broader shift. Big Tech is increasingly being treated not only as a source of growth, but also as a form of balance-sheet quality in an uncertain macro environment.
This matters because investors are dealing with higher yields, geopolitical shocks, inflation risks and uneven growth. In that environment, companies with net cash, pricing power, recurring revenues and high returns on capital naturally become more attractive.
That does not mean Big Tech is risk-free. It means the strongest names are now being used by investors as a blend of growth exposure and quality exposure.
The AI trade is not over, but it is maturing.
The market is moving away from simply rewarding any company with an AI narrative. Investors are becoming more focused on the difference between AI spend, AI revenue and AI margins.
That is why the split across major investors matters. Some are adding Alphabet. Some are adding Microsoft. Others are rotating between the same mega-cap names. The message is that the AI theme remains powerful, but the winners may become more stock-specific.
Investors may need to ask:
Who is spending heavily on AI?
Who can monetise AI through existing customer relationships?
Who has the balance sheet to fund the capex cycle?
Who is already priced for perfection?
Where is the market still underestimating long-term cash flow?
Berkshire’s portfolio became more focused in Q1. That fits a wider market pattern: many leading investors are concentrating around fewer, higher-conviction franchises.
But this is not a signal for everyday investors to run concentrated portfolios blindly. Berkshire has permanent capital, deep research resources and the ability to absorb volatility that most investors do not.
The more useful lesson is that diversification should not mean owning everything equally. In a market driven by earnings dispersion, quality dispersion and AI dispersion, investors may want to be more thoughtful about what each holding is doing in the portfolio.
13Fs are useful, but they are backward-looking. They show what large investors owned at quarter-end, not necessarily what they own today. They also do not show the full portfolio picture, including shorts, derivatives or non-U.S. holdings.
The value of 13Fs is not in copying trades. It is in understanding how sophisticated investors are thinking about themes, valuation and risk.
The Berkshire-Alphabet move is a reminder that value investing does not have to mean avoiding technology. In today’s market, some of the best cash-flow machines are technology platforms.
The important distinction is between buying technology because it is fashionable and buying technology because the business model is durable. Berkshire’s move looks closer to the second category.
The latest filings reinforce that mega-cap technology remains a core part of institutional portfolios. But they also show rotation within the group.
That means investors should avoid treating Big Tech as one single trade. Alphabet, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Meta and Nvidia all sit inside the technology ecosystem, but their risk drivers are different: advertising, cloud, devices, enterprise software, AI infrastructure, chips, capex and regulation.
The next phase of the AI trade may be less about owning the broad story and more about identifying where AI investment converts into revenue, margin resilience and free cash flow.
Higher bond yields raise the bar for equities. That makes companies with weak balance sheets, distant profits or uncertain cash flows more vulnerable.
This is why many large investors remain drawn to businesses with pricing power, scale and high returns on capital. In a world where the cost of capital is no longer zero, quality is not a luxury. It is a risk-management tool.
Berkshire still owns large positions in financials, consumer franchises and energy. The Delta purchase and Chevron trim also show that the portfolio is not simply rotating into technology.
The better interpretation is that Berkshire is building a portfolio that spans both old and new economy cash flows. That may be an important lesson for investors: AI can be a core theme, but it does not remove the need for diversification across sectors, economic cycles and risk drivers.
The latest 13F season sends a clear message: even the most valuation-conscious investors are making room for mega-cap technology when the business quality is strong enough.
Berkshire’s larger Alphabet stake is not necessarily a call to chase AI. It is a signal that the line between value and growth has blurred. In the Abel era, Berkshire may still be following the same discipline — buy durable businesses at sensible prices — but the opportunity set now includes digital platforms that Buffett’s earlier playbook never fully embraced.
For investors, the takeaway is simple: Big Tech remains important, AI still has structural legs, but selectivity is becoming crucial. The winners in the next phase may not be those with the loudest AI story, but those that can turn AI spending into durable cash flow.