QO_Q3_2019_1024x768_Eleanor
Video length: 2 minutes
Quarterly Outlook

Q3 Outlook: Monetary madness in the ‘miracle’ economy

Summary:  With the global economic outlook weakening and the Australian economy losing momentum, the Reserve Bank of Australia already in June began what is likely to be a series of cuts to its cash rate, which will probably land at 0.5% next year or even by year-end.

With the global economic outlook weakening and the Australian economy losing momentum, the Reserve Bank of Australia already in June began what is likely to be a series of cuts to its cash rate, which will probably land at 0.5% next year or even by year-end. Easier monetary policy will be required to deal with labour-market slack, weakness in the housing sector and falling consumption. 

Faced with a tumultuous political environment, Brexit woes, trade tensions, new battle lines on the front of global technology dominance and a slowing Chinese economy, businesses around the world are losing confidence, and global growth is ailing. This is apparent particularly when viewed through the prism of trade and manufacturing. The uncertainty paralyses decision-making at multinational companies, burdens capex intentions and forces supply chains to be unravelled to reduce risk as businesses are unsure of the regime under which they will operate in the coming years. 

Against this backdrop, US Federal Reserve chief Jerome Powell, no longer set to wean stocks of their addiction to easy monetary policy, has surrendered for a second time in a bid to bolster confidence. And the question is no longer if the Fed is prepared to act, but rather by how much. So a domino effect is in motion. As the global outlook weakens, central banks are faltering in their resolve. Both the Fed and the European Central Bank, which not long ago talked of raising rates, are now ready and willing to race to rock bottom. The Reserve Bank of Australia has already begun to tread down this treacherous path, having delivered in June the first in what will be a series of cuts to the cash rate, which is likely to land at 0.5% in 2020. The risk to this view is to the downside, and the cash rate could reach that level by year-end.

Australia’s near 30-year recession-free run, the envy of central bankers around the globe, is now at risk as economic malaise grips. The “wonder, down under” that escaped zero interest-rate policy, negative interest-rate policy and quantitative easing has not managed to vanquish the business cycle and will not be so lucky this time around. 

In Australia, easier monetary policy will be required given the sizeable spare capacity remaining in the economy which continues to lose momentum and is running well below potential. The weakness is likely to lead to a further rise in unemployment and persistent disinflationary pressures, even before a potential global shock appears. Remember, trade is just a sideshow for the unfolding rivalry between the 20th century’s superpower and the would-be hegemon of the 21st century’s bid for supremacy. And, while a trade deal could still be reached with China, Europe could easily be next in the firing line. But perhaps the main unknown here is US President Donald Trump’s calculation of what will score points with his voters, which could turn on a dime. 

Australia’s March quarter national accounts confirmed that the slowdown seen in the second half of 2018 has extended into 2019, with weakness in the housing sector and falling consumption key concerns. Labour-market slack, as measured by both unemployment and underemployment, needs to fall substantially before wages can rise. This significant spare capacity in the job market will be a major impediment before stagnating real wages reverse their course and relieve the pressure on debt-laden households. That would be critical for an economy where household consumption accounts for almost 60% of GDP. The RBA is communicating that unemployment now needs to fall below 4.5%, and even lower if overseas experience is anything to go by, before inflation would pick up. So, there is significant work to be done with unemployment currently sitting at 5.2%, well above the full-employment level needed to spur wage gains and inflationary pressures.

Combine stagnant wage growth, labour-market slack and an economy heavily reliant on private consumption, and you have an ugly cocktail for sub-trend economic growth. With the case to cut rates having been made, why wait? The RBA has materially shifted its assessment of the labour market and the degree of spare capacity that remains, so there is little to gain from holding off until August. So, next up is the bank’s July meeting, and one more cut is likely by November. The RBA has few options, especially considering the limited scope for banks to pass on further rate cuts as the official cash rate creeps towards the zero lower bound. Furthermore, the prospect that the Fed will cut rates goes against what the RBA has identified as a critical policy lever to stimulate the economy: the exchange rate. So, get ready for lower yields.

After three cuts by November, the RBA is likely to pause to assess the outlook, while remaining locked and loaded if conditions warrant further action. A fourth rate cut in play for 2020 would take the cash rate down to 0.5% which is likely the effective lower bound. One problem is that the RBA is up against the law of diminishing marginal returns in terms of policy stimulus. Don’t forget that in the previous four cutting cycles the RBA delivered an average of 300 basis points of easing. But, as Steen Jakobsen points out in his introduction to this outlook, the cost of capital is just one small piece of the puzzle, and, with interest rates already at historic lows, arguably not the main factor hindering economic growth. 

In the current low-rate environment and for the foreseeable future, fiscal policy therefore has a far more active role to play. So, what is the bigger problem? Governments shirking their responsibilities to focus on infighting instead of policy reform. Monetary stimulus is ineffective for the challenges we face, and bureaucrats in Canberra must have realistic expectations about what central banks can achieve to stimulate the economy. Monetary policy will never replace sound economic policy. So, rather than relying on central bankers to clean up the mess, the government must deliver productivity-enhancing reforms, infrastructure spending and other fiscal measures to restore confidence and start a self-sustaining recovery in economic growth. It needs to do that while expanding the productive capacity and potential output of the Australian economy — something the RBA has long bemoaned, and now more vocally than ever. But the newly elected treasurer Josh Frydenberg seems completely unperturbed by these challenges, and instead is determined to retain political capital and become the first treasurer to deliver a surplus in over a decade. Unfortunately, if the current slowdown persists and the credit impulse is right in indicating the economic low point remains ahead, Frydenberg may have no choice. After all, the credit cycle leads the economic cycle.

Where there is a policy power vacuum, the RBA must be ready to step in and do the heavy lifting in case of an enduring threat to growth and employment. Although the RBA hopes it will not need to resort to unorthodox measures, once the conventional policy toolkit has been exhausted (which is already close), the RBA would probably turn to quantitative easing if the economic outlook were to deteriorate further. Asset purchase programmes could take several forms, depending on the objective. Or, given that the RBA has a last-mover advantage, it could skip ineffective QE and retool asset purchases to go straight to “helicopter money” or infrastructure spending, in keeping with the global fiscal panic. However, such a move would likely require an economic crisis to unfold. 

Disclaimer

Confidentiality and Usage:
You may not reproduce, distribute, or transmit this material or any portion thereof without prior written permission from Saxo.

Nature of Information:
The information provided herein is based on current market conditions and analysts' opinions, which may reflect personal views of the author, and are subject to change without notice. This material does not include a record of any trading prices, or an offer of, or solicitation for, or endorsement to enter into any transaction in any investment product. Any forecast on the economy, markets and economic trends of the markets provided is not necessarily indicative of the future or likely performance of the investment product subject of this material.

Responsibility and Liability:
Saxo accepts no liability for any use that may be made of these comments or for any consequences that arise from such use. Saxo does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any information provided and assumes no liability for any errors, omissions, losses, or damages resulting from the use of this information.

The information provided in this material is solely for information only. It is intended for general circulation and does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any particular person. Accordingly, it should not be relied on or treated as a substitute for specific advice concerning specific situations of any person. Please seek advice from a financial adviser regarding the suitability of any investment product taking into account your specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs before you make a commitment to purchase an investment product. In the event that you choose not to seek advice from a financial adviser, you should consider whether any investment product mentioned in this publication is suitable for you.

Notwithstanding the above, insofar as any information provided herein contains research analyses or reports concerning any investment product authored by any foreign research house and is issued or promulgated to a person in Singapore who is not an accredited investor, expert investor, and/or institutional investor, Saxo Capital Market Pte. Ltd. accepts legal responsibility for the contents of this material to the extent required by law. Recipients of such material are to contact Saxo Capital Markets Pte. Ltd. in respect of any matters arising from, or in connection with, this material.

Risk Disclosure:
Trading in investment products involve significant risk, including the risk of losing your entire investment. Historical returns are not a guarantee of future returns. Prices can both rise and fall, and there is a risk that you will not get back the money you invested.

Conflicts of interest:
The author may hold positions in the investment products mentioned. The author does not own positions in the underlying investment product exceeding 0.5% of its market capitalisation, save as otherwise declared. The author is not permitted to trade the mentioned investment products within the first 24 hours after the publication of this article.

Saxo maintains partnerships with companies that compensate Saxo for promotional activities conducted on its platform. Additionally, Saxo has agreements with certain partners who provide retrocession contingent upon clients purchasing specific investment products offered by these partners. While Saxo receives compensation from these partnerships, all content is conducted with the intention of providing clients with valuable options and information.

Publication details:
If any listed companies are the subject of the material, the content has not been submitted to the companies in question prior to publication.

Please refer to our full disclaimer and notification on non-independent investment research for more details.

Saxo Markets
88 Market Street
CapitaSpring #31-01
Singapore 048948

Contact Saxo

Singapore
Singapore

Saxo Capital Markets Pte Ltd ('Saxo Markets') is a company authorised and regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) [Co. Reg. No.: 200601141M ] and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Saxo Bank A/S, headquartered in Denmark. Please refer to our General Business Terms & Risk Warning to consider whether acquiring or continuing to hold financial products is suitable for you, prior to opening an account and investing in a financial product.

Saxo is part of the J. Safra Sarasin Group.

Trading in financial instruments carries various risks, and is not suitable for all investors. Please seek expert advice, and always ensure that you fully understand these risks before trading. Trading in leveraged products such as Margin FX products may result in your losses exceeding your initial deposits. Saxo Markets does not provide financial advice, any information available on this website is ‘general’ in nature and for informational purposes only. Saxo Markets does not take into account an individual’s needs, objectives or financial situation.

The Saxo trading platform has received numerous awards and recognition. For details of these awards and information on awards visit www.home.saxo/en-sg/about-us/awards.

The information or the products and services referred to on this website may be accessed worldwide, however is only intended for distribution to and use by recipients located in countries where such use does not constitute a violation of applicable legislation or regulations. Products and Services offered on this website are not intended for residents of the United States, Malaysia and Japan. Please click here to view our full disclaimer.

This advertisement has not been reviewed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

Apple and the Apple logo are trademarks of Apple Inc, registered in the US and other countries and regions. App Store is a service mark of Apple Inc. Google Play and the Google Play logo are trademarks of Google LLC.